Is the U.S. at risk of losing its vote at the UN?
Skirting the edge of Article 19
Last week, the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly received its semi-annual briefing on the financial situation of the United Nations, which laid bare the dire state of UN finances. The largest culprit is the United States, which is responsible for over two thirds of all unpaid assessments, though China and Russia also owe considerable amounts, as the second and third-largest debtors.
Between the U.S. fiscal year 2026 budget request, the rescission packages, and the recent announcements about willingness to pay for peacekeeping missions in the DRC and Lebanon as well as the new UN Support Office for Haiti (UNSOH), it’s very clear that the United States intends to take an à la carte approach to its financial contributions to the UN, funding only what it is interested in regardless of its obligations under international law.
The mounting arrears also mean that the United States is fast approaching the threshold for the loss of their vote in the General Assembly. How close is the United States to this, what is the Trump administration likely to do, and what might be the consequences?
Article 19 and the threshold for losing the vote
Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, Member States whose level of arrears exceed the total amount assessed in the previous two years lose their vote in the General Assembly unless the General Assembly determines that the arrears are due to circumstances beyond the control of the Member State.
The U.S. assessments for 2024 and 2025 were as follows:
As shown during the briefing, the U.S. owed a total of 3.883 million as of 30 September 2025. This is more than what it owes in a single year, but not quite enough to trigger Article 19 for calendar year 2026.
Furthermore, we have not received any signals that the U.S. intends to pay its contributions to the regular budget or the IRMCT, but the U.S. indicated that it will pay its contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Lebanon, as well as UNSOH.1 It also reportedly informed the UN that it a payment of $680 million for its peacekeeping assessments is forthcoming.
But what about next year?
Assuming that the overall level of approved budgets next year is not dramatically different from this year (e.g., factoring in a likely decrease in the 2026 regular budget and the approval of a full-year budget for UNSOH), the level of U.S. arrears in 2026 will potentially exceed $5.3 billion, prompting a loss of vote in calendar year 2027 unless the United States pays enough to avoid crossing the Article 19 threshold (potentially around $1 billion). Moreover, the continued accumulation of arrears would essentially force the U.S. to pay an amount comparable to a full year’s assessment in 2027 and in every year thereafter if it wants to maintain its vote.
It is highly unlikely that the United States would be willing to make a payment of such a magnitude, even setting aside the Trump administration’s à la carte approach. This is because of the U.S. practice of engaging in conditional and unconditional withholding of its assessed contributions since 1980, which I explained in greater detail in a policy brief on the liquidity crisis last year.
My expectation is therefore that, at some point before the end of the Trump term (i.e., in either 2027 or 2028), the United States will trigger the application of Article 19 and lose its vote in the General Assembly. Though this might embolden elements of the Republican Party who have long advocated for withdrawal from the UN, I’ve previously argued that the United States is likely to continue to see value in continued membership, especially given that Article 19 and the loss of vote in the General Assembly does not affect U.S. participation in other main organs of the UN. In other words, the U.S. would be able to continue wielding its vote and veto in the Security Council. This mode of participation would be in line with the new foreign policy doctrine of the Trump administration and its belief that the UN should focus narrowly on international peace and security.
Looking ahead
So, what can be done about this?
Bold proposals—not just lame exhortations for Member States to pay in full and on time, or recycling of old proposals that Member States have repeatedly declined to endorse—are needed from the Secretary-General to meet the liquidity crisis. Budget cuts that worsen the cash position of the Organization are definitely not the answer. A supplemental assessment may provide an answer in a way that doesn’t require other Member States to pay extra or reward “bad behavior” on the part of deadbeats such as the United States.
A loss of vote by the United States is objectively a bad outcome for the Organization and its relationship with its host country, but may also have a silver lining in that it could galvanize efforts to enhance the role of the General Assembly not only in peace and security, but also in the areas in which the United States has adopted an obstructionist stance. After all, previous crises at the UN and periods of intense geopolitical competition have also been periods of great creativity and innovation. Whomever is elected Secretary-General next year will need to be ready to manage these risks and leverage these opportunities from the moment they enter office.
© 2025 Eugene Chen under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
The fact that Member States receive a separate assessment for each peacekeeping mission (other than UNTSO and UNMOGIP, which are funded from the regular budget) enables an à la carte approach.