Reimbursement: A missing piece in discussions on the effectiveness of UN peace operations

Amateurs talk about doctrine; professionals talk about money

Reimbursements to troop- and police-contributing countries are an under-appreciated factor in the effectiveness of UN peace operations. Not only do such reimbursements—which cover both personnel and contingent-owned equipment (COE)—represent the largest sources of expenditure in peacekeeping mission budgets, but they also underpin the entire architecture for the engagement of uniformed personnel in UN peace operations. The manner in which reimbursements are paid creates a series of incentives and disincentives for troop- and police-contributing countries that shapes both the form and function of military and police contingents.

Over the past two decades, the uniformed components of UN peace operations have often been criticized for underperformance. Missions have also struggled with generating specialized capabilities that fall outside of standardized unit types such as infantry battalions, engineering companies, and formed police units. Despite the fact that these issues have been repeatedly identified in reviews and acknowledged by the General Assembly and Security Council, little has changed. This is because nothing has been done to adjust the reimbursement frameworks to enable the required changes in Member State behaviour and Secretariat procedure.

In 2026, the current four-year review cycle of the personnel reimbursement rate and the three-year review cycle of the COE framework will align for the first time. The General Assembly should not miss this opportunity to examine the functioning of the entire reimbursement system and begin making the changes necessary to ensure that personnel and COE reimbursement enable, rather than impede, effective peace operations.

The reimbursement system today

The reimbursement system consists of the following main components, paid to troop- and police-contributing countries for contingents deployed to peacekeeping and special political missions:

1. Personnel reimbursement: Payment to defray “common and essential additional costs” incurred as a result of deployment to UN peace operations;

2. Major equipment COE: Payment for the use and maintenance of equipment deployed by contingents in support of mandate implementation (e.g., vehicles and engineering equipment);

3. Self-sustainment COE: Payment for the cost of goods and services to contingents (e.g., accommodations, catering, and laundry) not provided by the UN.

Personnel reimbursement

Standardized rates of personnel reimbursement was first introduced by the General Assembly in 1974.¹ In 2001, the General Assembly attempted to establish a stronger methodological basis for reimbursement rates by introducing a cost survey, but this effort was hamstrung by low response rates. The resulting lack of adjustment to reimbursement rates was a source of major tension between major troop- and police-contributing countries and major financial contributors, which prompted the General Assembly to take a new approach to determining reimbursement on the basis of a quadrennial survey of a representative sample of troop- and police-contributing countries in 2013.² The current rate agreed under this approach is $1,448 per person per month.³

At the same time, the General Assembly introduced three elements to incentivize improved performance:

• A risk premium payable to units that performed well under situations of elevated risk,

• An enabling capabilities premium to incentivize the deployment of critical enabling units (e.g., that are perennially in short supply, and

• A deduction to the reimbursement for contingents with a high degree of contingent-owned equipment unserviceability.

Although the unserviceability deduction is automatically calculated, it has been several years since risk and enabling premiums have been paid, likely due to lack of awareness of these premiums on the part of the force commanders and police commissioners responsible for nominating eligible units.

Contingent-owned equipment

The COE framework that exists today was put in place in the 1990s to help meet the post-Cold War surge in demand for peacekeeping operations. Every three years, the COE Working Group meets to make recommendations on the COE framework; these are generally rubber-stamped by the Fifth Committee and General Assembly. Once approved, the Secretariat issues an updated compendium on the standards, policies, and rates of reimbursement in the form of the COE Manual, the most recent of which was issued in 2023.

For major equipment, the COE framework includes standardized monthly rates of reimbursement for generic types of equipment based primarily on the generic fair market value and estimated useful life recommended by the COE Working Group. Reimbursement is paid to troop- and police-contributing countries for equipment deployed as part of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the country and the Secretariat and which is verified by the Secretariat as operational during quarterly inspections.

This, however, creates an incentive for countries to maximize their reimbursement by pushing to include as much equipment as possible in the MOU regardless of whether it is required, to deploy old and obsolete equipment rather than new and more capable equipment of the same type given that the same reimbursement rates apply, and to avoid using equipment given that equipment that is non-operational—whether due to regular wear and tear, maintenance shortfalls, hostile action, or any other reason—is not eligible for reimbursement.

Moreover, the manner in which reimbursement is provided compensates contributing countries for the use of equipment already in inventory but does not facilitate the procurement of new or specialized equipment for deployment. The contingent-owned equipment system also gives the responsibility for the provision of petrol, oil, and lubricants to the UN, which disincentivizes contributing countries from deploying more efficient equipment and reinforcing the traditional reliance of peace operations on diesel generators for their electricity requirements.

Looking forward

Member States should not treat the next triennial meeting of the COE Working Group next month and the Fifth Committee consideration of the personnel and COE reimbursement frameworks in May 2026 as business as usual. They should take advantage of the fact that 2026 is the first time that the General Assembly will have an opportunity to examine the contingent-owned equipment system and the personnel reimbursement framework at the same time to identify ways of better aligning the two elements into a consolidated approach to enabling the deployment of required capacities and incentivizing performance of contingents deployed to UN peace operations. This does not necessarily entail changing the overall amount of reimbursement that is provided to troop- and police-contributing countries, but instead reallocating reimbursement in a way that incentivizes improved performance.

For example, reimbursement for major equipment should more clearly distinguish between reimbursement for the opportunity costs incurred by countries in deploying equipment on one hand and reimbursement for the risk and additional wear and tear on equipment on account of actual utilization in support of operations. The existing mission factors in the COE system reflect the average baseline conditions in the mission area but not the actual conditions under which individual units operate. An additional element that can be considered is the application of a risk premium, the eligibility of which could mirror that payable as part of personnel reimbursement.

For new and specialized capabilities, the UN should be more willing to work outside the standard force and police generation frameworks and make use of letter of assist arrangements, which are essentially procurement contracts with Member States used for high-value assets such as military aircraft and warships, ideally using requests for proposal to see what capabilities are available among all Member States to meet specific non-standard requirements.

Member States and the Secretariat should also examine the reasons why the risk and enabling capabilities premiums under the personnel reimbursement framework have not been sufficiently utilized in the past decade. This should include a decision on whether to retain the current approach of making the risk premium payable to individuals rather than to the contributing country. After all, risk aversion on the part of contingents is more a function of national policy rather than on decisions at the level of individual troops or police. The necessary adjustments to the amounts payable under these premiums and the procedures for applying them should then be made to ensure that these have the intended effect on incentivizing performance.

Final thoughts

In the joint report submitted by the UN and the African Union pursuant to Security Council resolution 2748, the Security Council was asked to approve a “hybrid implementation” of Security Council resolution 2719, saying that:

The 2719 financing framework would only be applied to the AUSSOM budget with 75 percent of assessed contributions with priority given to covering, in full, troop reimbursements at a new mission specific rate of 1,000 USD.

Setting aside the fact that it is the General Assembly, not the Security Council, which has the responsibility under the Charter for budgetary matters, the proposed reimbursement rate not only ignores methodology approved by the General Assembly in 2013, but it is also disregards the guidelines and general principles adopted by the General Assembly for the determination of rates of personnel reimbursement, including the need for rates to be based on data on actual costs incurred for common and essential additional costs, namely allowances, clothing, gear and equipment, pre-deployment medical expenses, and inland travel.⁴ Worse, the fact that this joint report was never issued as an official document meant that the General Assembly was never formally made aware that the Secretary-General had made such a proposal to the Security Council.

The General Assembly should also take advantage of the fact that the Security Council ultimately did not decide to apply the financing framework of resolution 2719 on the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia⁵ to revisit the question of whether the UN contingent-owned equipment system and personnel reimbursement frameworks—which were developed for the operational requirements of peacekeeping operations, taking into account the diversity of the UN troop- and police-contributing countries—are appropriate for African Union peace enforcement and counterterrorism operations, which have very different operational requirements.⁶

As the Secretary-General has previously recommended, the African Union should develop a reimbursement framework appropriate for its peace support operations doctrine rather than to attempt to retrofit the UN framework to African Union missions.⁷ But for such reimbursements to be payable through UN assessed contributions would first require approval by the General Assembly.

© 2025 Eugene Chen under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations University.

1. General Assembly decision of 29 November 1974 on Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Twenty-Ninth Session, Volume 1 (pp. 140).

2. General Assembly resolution 67/261

3. General Assembly resolution 76/276

4. General Assembly resolution 55/274

5. United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated 23 May 2025 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Secretary-General,” S/2025/322, 2025, https://undocs.org/en/S/2025/322.

6. United Nations (2023). Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council (S/2023/303) (pp. 12). https://undocs.org/en/S/2023/303

7. United Nations (2017). Report of the Secretary-General on options for authorization and support for African Union peace support operations (S/2017/454) (pp. 18). https://undocs.org/en/S/2017/454